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ABSTRACT
Reverse engineering is critical to reasoning about how a system behaves. While
complete access to a system inherently allows for perfect analysis, partial access is
inherently uncertain. This is the case for an individual agent in a distributed system.
Inductive Reverse Engineering (IRE) enables analysis under such circumstances.
IRE does this by producing program spaces consistent with individual input-
output examples for a given domain-specific language. Then, IRE intersects those
program spaces to produce a generalized program consistent with all examples. IRE,
an easy to use framework, allows this domain-specific language to be specified in
the form of Theorists, which produce Theorys, a succinct way of representing the
program space.
Programs are often much more complex than simple string transformations.
One of the ways in which they are more complex is in the way that they follow
a conversation-like behavior, potentially following some underlying protocol. As a
result, IRE represents program interactions as Conversations in order to more cor-
rectly model a distributed system. This, for instance, enables IRE to model dynami-
cally captured inputs received from other agents in the distributed system.
While domain-specific knowledge provided by a user is extremely valuable, such
information is not always possible. IRE mitigates this by automatically inferring pro-
gram grammars, allowing it to still perform efficient searches of the program space.
It does this by intersecting conversations prior to synthesis in order to understand
what portions of conversations are constant.
IRE exists to be a tool that can aid in automatic reverse engineering across nu-
merous domains. Further, IRE aspires to be a centralized location and interface for
implementing program synthesis and automatic black box analysis techniques.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Reverse engineering is a methodology for precisely analyzing the internal work-
ings and substructure of a process or system in order to better understand how it
works. In practice, it is done in the absence of high-level specifications and can be
thought of as working backward through the standard engineering process—design
towards implementation—and instead, implementation towards design. In theory,
reverse engineering is relatively straightforward: simply observe how the internals
are operating and how the subcomponents are connected. Of course, it is more nu-
anced than this; but even so, a complete working system that can be observed is, by
its very nature, perfectly descriptive of what it does and how it works. This is an un-
derlying requirement of standard reverse engineering. In hardware, a physical object
is disassembled and examined. In software, its source code is read through, or in its
absence, binary disassembled and machine code analyzed.
Consider, however, the task of reverse engineering without complete access to
observing the system. This is the case in distributed systems, where some agent has
only partial access to the overall system. Take for instance web applications, where a
client makes a request to a server and is only made aware of its response. From the
client’s perspective, the server is merely a black-box—an oracle—that takes some
input and returns some output. What happens in between is left unknown to the
client. In such cases, reverse engineering becomes inherently uncertain.
Further consider the problem of systems in which interactions take place between
persons and computers; for instance, a human interacting with some computer pro-
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gram in a repetitive way. This constitutes a distributed system, where part of the
program takes place in the computer, but also part of it takes place in the person’s
intentions towards interacting with the computer. In such cases, the program oc-
curring in the person’s intentions—in the person’s mind—is but a black-box to the
computer. It is in this way that reverse engineering may be applied not only towards
analyzing a computer, but also a person. Reverse engineering may be useful here in
order to profile or improve upon the user experience of the person.
Although reverse engineering in these situations becomes an inherently uncertain
process, this does not stop human-efforts in reverse engineering. In practice, hu-
mans build up an entire model of the black-box system under analysis. They make
assumptions based on past systems, attempt to rule out and confirm these assump-
tions, and use intuition as a means of guiding this process. This inductive reasoning
forms the basis for inductive reverse engineering: IRE.
IRE serves to solve this problem of reverse engineering in a black-box environ-
ment. IRE is an easy to use, open source, Python 3 framework, that enables users
to transform input-output examples into executable programs consistent with those
examples. This effectively allows for programming by example. Users can easily in-
troduce domain-specific knowledge about the problem they are working on to further
enhance this process.
2
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
This sort of reverse engineering without access to internals has become a mas-
sively important skill, and in particular, critical to cybersecurity. Take for instance
phone phreaking, where early hackers mapped out the phone network and how it
worked simply by interacting with it using various tones and observing the results [1].
In more recent times, penetration testing has become an important profession that
often relies on reverse engineering in order to audit the security of companies from
the perspective of an outside attacker.
One of the common tasks of a penetration tester is in utilizing tools such as
black-box web vulnerability scanners. These scanners naively scan a web application,
blindly sending exploits at input points and trying to detect if they worked. A survey
of these tools shows that there is much work to be done in improving them [2].
Furthermore, efforts to provide more semantic information about an application’s
state has proven to be effective, despite still fundamentally only having black-box
access [3].
In response to the demand for reverse engineering, recent efforts have been made
to push towards Cyber Reasoning Systems which aid in this effort, and in some cases
entirely automate it. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
led an initiative to develop fully autonomous systems capable of reverse engineering
and exploiting challenge binaries in their Cyber Grand Challenge [4]. This has led to
significant advances in program analysis and various techniques surrounding state-
of-the-art reverse engineering. Many of these techniques can be seen in open source
3
frameworks for performing program analysis including angr and Manticore [5]–[8].
These frameworks provide users with tools for precisely reasoning about a program
by analyzing their internals.
4
Chapter 3
THEORISTS AND THEORIES
IRE works around two central primitives: theorists and theories. Theorists use
input-output examples to produce theories. They act as a sort of domain-specific
language. Theories use input to produce output. They model the synthesized pro-
gram.
3.1 Grammar Theorists
IRE fundamentally solves a parsing problem. It must parse input-output exam-
ples to produce a program, not entirely dissimilar to a programming language parser
which parses source code to produce a program. For this reason, it is useful to
think in terms of context-free grammars. While in the programming language realm
Figure 1. Theorist
5
Figure 2. Theory
1 import ire
2
3 class HTML(ire.GrammarTheorist, entry=’html’):
4 html = ire.RepeatTheorist(html_element)
5 html_element = (open_tag & close_tag & self_tag) | data
6
7 open_tag = ’<’ + tag_content + ’>’
8 close_tag = ’</’ + tag_name + ’>’
9 self_tag = ’<’ + tag_content + ’/>’
10
11 data = ’.|\n’ & ire.FunctionTheorist(None) & ire.FunctionTheorist(b64)
12
13 tag_content = (tag_name + whitespace + attributes) | tag_name
14 tag_name = ’[a-zA-Z]+’
15
16 attributes = (attribute + whitespace + attributes) | attribute
17 attribute = ’[a-zA-Z]+’ & (’[a-zA-Z]+=”’ + attribute_value + ’”’)
18 attribute_value = ’[a-zA-Z0-9]’
19
20 whitespace = ’\s+’
Figure 3. HTML Grammar Theorist
context-free grammars strive to be unambiguous, IRE leverages ambiguity to pro-
duce the program space. Consider, for instance, the HTML grammar theorist (Figure
3) written using the IRE framework.
Here, a GrammarTheorist is defined, with html being the entry point, or start
symbol in context-free grammar terminology. Variables that appear on the left side of
6
an = indicate a nonterminal symbol, while all other expressions are terminal symbols.
Each of these assignments forms the basis for a production rule.
Strings are implicitly RegexTheorists, which as the name suggests, perform
regex matching. Addition expressions (using the + operator) are implicitly
ConcatTheorists, which serve to concatenate theorists, and their produced the-
ories, together.
Rather than defining several production rules for the same nonterminal, operators
& and | both respectively serve to implicitly create AndTheorists and OrTheorists.
All theorists within an AndTheorist will attempt to produce theories. After some
theorist within an OrTheorist has produced some number of theories, any remain-
ing theorists will not be given a chance to produce theories. This evaluation takes
place from left to right and allows for a conditionally restricted search space, and
consequently more efficient parsing. On line 5, the OrTheorist indicates that an
html_element can be an open_tag, close_tag and self_tag, or if that is not the case
then it must be data.
On line 4, the RepeatTheorist indicates that parsing should repeatedly consume
(one or more times) html_elements until it no longer can. Implementation wise,
this is more efficient than how looping is traditionally performed in context-free
grammars by having a self-referential production rule.
FunctionTheorists wrap functions to make them behave as theorists. Line 11
showcases two of these theorists. FunctionTheorist(None) indicates the identity
function (f(x) = x). FunctionTheorist(b64) on the other hand assumes the existence
of a b64 function (defined elsewhere), which base64 encodes its input.
7
1 def echo(name, msg):
2 return \
3 f”””
4 <html>
5 <head>
6 <title>Echo</title>
7 </head>
8 <body>
9 <p>Hello {name}!</p>
10 <p>”{msg}” is {b64(msg)}</p>
11 </body>
12 </html>
13 ”””
Figure 4. Simple HTML Echo Program
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello Paul!</p>
<p>“Hello World” is SGVsbG8gV29ybGQ=</p>
</body>
</html>
Figure 5. Output of Simple HTML Echo Program
3.2 Theorists to Theories
Consider the simple HTML echo program (Figure 4) in order to understand how
IRE is able to utilize the prior HTML grammar theorist (Figure 3) to reason about
this program and produce theories.
This simple program (Figure 4) transforms the inputs into an HTML output.
Inputs name=’Paul’ and msg=’Hello World’ result in the output shown in Figure
5.
Running this input-output example (Figure 5) through the prior HTML grammar
8
{
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello {{{Input[0]}}, Paul}!</p>
<p>“{{{Input[1]}}, Hello World}” is {{{b64(Input[1])}}, SGVsbG8gV29ybGQ=}</p>
</body>
</html>
}
Figure 6. Simple HTML Echo Theory
theorist (Figure 3) results in the theory shown in Figure 6, displayed as a simple
program summary using the IRE framework.
In this simple program summary (Figure 6), the gray curly braces and commas
representUnionTheorys, and the blue text represents individual theories within those
UnionTheorys. UnionTheorys are a way of succinctly representing the program
space, allowing common theories among candidate program traces to not be re-
peated, effectively forming a directed acyclic graph. Double curly braces indicate
theories that depend on the input (e.g. FunctionTheorys).
This shows an interesting result common to running a theorist against only one
input-output example: the complete original constant output by itself appears as a
possible program trace within the program space. These constant theories can be
ruled out only with more input-output examples.
3.3 Theory Intersection
In order to collapse the program space, theories resulting from different input-
output examples must be intersected together.
9
Figure 7. Theory Intersection
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello Pablo!</p>
<p>“Hola Mundo” is SG9sYSBNdW5kbw==</p>
</body>
</html>
Figure 8. Another Output of Simple HTML Echo Program
{
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello {{{Input[0]}}, Pablo}!</p>
<p>“{{{Input[1]}}, Hola Mundo}” is {{{b64(Input[1])}}, SG9sYSBNdW5kbw==}</p>
</body>
</html>
}
Figure 9. Another Simple HTML Echo Theory
Inputs name=’Pablo’ and msg=’Hola Mundo’ result in the output shown in Fig-
ure 8.
Running this input-output example (Figure 8) through the prior HTML grammar
theorist (Figure 3) results in the theory shown in Figure 9, displayed as a simple
program summary using the IRE framework.
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{
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello {{{Input[0]}}}!</p>
<p>“{{{Input[1]}}}” is {{{b64(Input[1])}}}</p>
</body>
</html>
}
Figure 10. Simple HTML Echo Theory Intersected
Intersecting the first theory (Figure 6) with the second theory (Figure 9), results
in just one program trace in the program space: our original program (Figure 4).
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Chapter 4
CONVERSATIONS
Often times, distributed programs follow a conversation-like behavior, potentially
following some underlying protocol. In such cases, program synthesis cannot merely
take place over only simple input-output examples. Instead, input-output examples
must be generalized to conversation examples. Here, discerning between input and
output doesn’t necessarily make sense, as it depends on an agent’s perspective. In-
stead, a conversation takes place over a series of messages, where a message has
some source agent and destination agent. Further, these agents have context–a gen-
eralization of input–representing what an agent individually brings as their input to
a particular conversation. This allows for some notion of state. Nevertheless, in a
deterministic program, identical contexts will produce identical conversations.
Figure 11. Conversation
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Figure 12. Capture Theorist and Capture Theory
4.1 Capturing Theorists and Theories
An agent is not aware of other agents’ contexts; only its own context and any
received messages. This is a fundamental problem in reverse engineering distributed
systems. Therefore, IRE must use an agent’s received messages in order to recover
the sender’s context. It does so using CaptureTheorists and CaptureTheorys.
CaptureTheorists wrap other theorists and effectively leverage their ability to
parse. Those CaptureTheorists go on to create CaptureTheorys, which also wrap
those same theorists. During synthesis, the underlying theorists attempt to produce
theories, and anything consumed during this is captured. This captured data may then
be used in later theorists, much like a traditional input. Those produced theories do
not actually become a part of the program space, but instead the CaptureTheorys
storing the underlying theorist does. This allows this parsing done during the synthe-
sis to be performed again during execution of the theory.
Consider the HTTP theorists shown in Figure 13, written using the IRE frame-
work, in order to understand how these CaptureTheorists and CaptureTheorys may
be applied.
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In the case of web applications, it is common for an HTTP server to negotiate
some token, commonly known as a cookie, for keeping track of state with its clients
[9]. Cookies are a way of enabling statefulness in the otherwise stateless HTTP pro-
tocol. An HTTP client will include the cookies associated with a particular server
with all web requests made to that server. By introducing a CaptureTheorist on line
28, this behavior is effectively conveyed and enables IRE to capture the cookie.
Now consider the HTTP conversation (Figure 14) that results from the client’s
context of username=’Paul’, password=’p455w0rd’, and msg=’Hello_World’;
and unknown to the client, server’s context of cookie=’sessionid=12345’.
Running this conversation example (Figure 14) through the prior HTTP theorist
(Figure 13) results in the theory shown in Figure 15, displayed as a simple program
summary using the IRE framework.
With another example conversation, this program space could be collapsed as
discussed in Section 3.3.
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1 class HTTPRequest(ire.OutputMessageTheorist, entry=’request’):
2 request = request_prolog + headers + ’\n’ + request_contents
3 request_prolog = ’(GET|POST) ’ + request_url + ’ HTTP/1.1\n’
4 request_url = ire.RepeatTheorist(request_url_data)
5 request_url_data = ’[^ ]’ & inputs
6
7 headers = ire.RepeatTheorist(header)
8 header = ’[a-zA-Z-]+: ’ + ire.RepeatTheorist(header_data) + ’\n’
9 header_data = ’.’ & inputs
10
11 request_contents = ire.RepeatTheorist(request_contents_data) | ’’
12 request_contents_data = ’.|\n’ & inputs
13
14 inputs = ire.FunctionTheorist(None) & ire.FunctionTheorist(b64)
15
16
17 class HTTPResponse(ire.InputMessageTheorist, entry=’response’):
18 response = response_prolog + headers + ’\n’ + response_contents
19 response_prolog = ’HTTP/1.1 [0-9]+ [a-zA-Z ]+\n’
20
21 headers = ire.RepeatTheorist(cookie_header | header)
22 cookie_header = ’Set-Cookie: ’ + cookie + ’\n’
23 header = ’[a-zA-Z-]+: ’ + ire.RepeatTheorist(header_data) + ’\n’
24 header_data = ’.’ & inputs
25
26 response_contents = HTML() | ’’
27
28 cookie = ire.CaptureTheorist(cookie_data, ’cookie’)
29 cookie_data = ’[a-zA-Z]+=[a-zA-Z0-9]+’
30
31 inputs = ire.FunctionTheorist(None) & ire.FunctionTheorist(b64)
32
33
34 http = HTTPRequest() & HTTPResponse()
Figure 13. HTTP Theorist
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POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/json
{“username”: “Paul”, “password”: “p455w0rd”}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: sessionid=12345
Connection: close
GET /echo?msg=Hello_World HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Cookie: sessionid=12345
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo base64</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello Paul!</p>
<p>“Hello_World” is SGVsbG9fV29ybGQ=</p>
</body>
</html>
Figure 14. Simple HTTP Conversation
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{
POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/json
{“username”: “{{{Input[username]}}, Paul}”, “password”: “{{{Input[password]}}, p455w0rd}”}
}
{
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: {{{Capture[cookie]}}}
Connection: close
}
{
GET /echo?msg={{{Input[msg]}}, Hello_World} HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Cookie: {{{Input[cookie]}}, sessionid=12345}
}
{
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo base64</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello {{{Input[username]}}, Paul}!</p>
<p>“{{{Input[msg]}}, Hello_World}” is {{{b64(Input[username])}},
SGVsbG9fV29ybGQ=}</p>
</body>
</html>
}
Figure 15. Simple HTTP Theory
17
Chapter 5
GRAMMARLESS SYNTHESIS
While it is useful to be able to provide domain-specific knowledge to an analysis,
doing so is not always possible. Providing a grammar to IRE allows it to be more
efficient in its search, by reducing the possible program space. Consider, for instance,
the grammar shown in Figure 16 which is highly generic.
This grammar (Figure 16) repeatedly matches against a single byte and derivations
of the input. Repeatedly matching against a single byte is what effectively drives the
parsing forward.
Inputs name=’Paul’ and msg=’body’ run against the prior simple program (Fig-
ure 4) and through the generic theorist (Figure 16) result in the theory shown in
Figure 17, displayed as a simple program summary using the IRE framework.
1 class Generic(ire.GrammarTheorist, entry=’entry’):
2 entry = ire.RepeatTheorist(data)
3 data = ’.|\n’ & ire.FunctionTheorist(None) & ire.FunctionTheorist(b64)
Figure 16. Generic Theorist
{
<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<{{{Input[1]}}, body}>
<p>Hello {{{Input[0]}}, Paul}!</p>
<p>“{{{Input[1]}}, body}” is {{{b64(Input[1])}}, Ym9keQ==}</p>
</{{{Input[1]}}, body}>
</html>
}
Figure 17. Generic Theory
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Note that in this case, the HTML body tags are considered to have been poten-
tially derived from the input. Of course, with another input-output example, this
program space could be collapsed to resolve this as discussed in Section 3.3. Nev-
ertheless, it is useful for demonstrating how much extra work must be needlessly
done in the absence of domain-specific knowledge about the HTML structure of
this program’s output.
5.1 Conversation Intersection
The prior structure of the generic theorist (Figure 16) does not scale very well
with message sizes and the number of core theorists (e.g. FunctionTheorists).
Consider for instance a message of 100,000 bytes, with hundreds of potential
FunctionTheorists and CaptureTheorists defined to allow for all sorts of context
derivations. This would likely be the case in applying IRE to real world web appli-
cations, where HTML pages get quite large, and context derivations quite complex.
Under such circumstances, applying this sort of generic theorist would become in-
feasible.
Fortunately, IRE can do much better by analyzing multiple conversations at once,
prior to producing their theories and intersecting them. With this early access, IRE
can perform a sort of conversation intersection before it begins its traditional analysis.
In doing so, IRE analyzes the supplied conversations to determine their structure. In
particular, it looks for portions of messages which remain constant throughout all of
the conversations. IRE uses the insight that if portions of a message don’t change
across any conversation examples, then it must be the case that a consistent program
trace keeps it constant. Boldly, IRE assumes that it must be constant.
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<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello Pa{u, b}l{, o}</p>
<p>“H{ell, }o{, la}” is SG{V, 9}s{bG8, VQ=}=</p>
</body>
</html>
Figure 18. Conversation Intersection
Effectively, IRE automatically generates a grammar, where constant sections are
parsed by constant theorists, and nonconstant sections are parsed by all supplied core
theorists. This can dramatically decrease the program search space. However, IRE
must first determine which sections of messages are constant, and which aren’t.
This is done by taking all corresponding messages across all conversations, and
finding the longest common substring across them. The longest common substring
is marked as being constant in the grammar, and this is recursively applied to all the
prefixes and all the suffixes. This continues on until there no longer is a common
substring. This ultimately results in marking the maximum amount of constant data
across all conversations.
Observe what happens (Figure 18) when the output from input name=’Paul’ and
msg=’Hello’ and output from input name=’Pablo’ and msg=’Hola’ run against the
prior simple program (Figure 4) are intersected.
This shows an interesting result common to intersecting only a few examples: too
much of the conversation is marked constant. This can potentially cause problems
with inputs being fragmented, though this is not necessarily a major issue. Fortu-
nately, though, with more examples this problem is resolved. Figure 19 shows the
result of introducing another output due to input name=’Joe’ and msg=’ABC’.
This discovered structure (Figure 19), in turn, is used by IRE for automatically
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<html>
<head>
<title>Echo</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Hello {Paul, Pablo, Joe}!</p>
<p>“{Hello, Hola, ABC}” is {SGVsbG8=, SG9sYQ==, QUJD}</p>
</body>
</html>
Figure 19. Another Conversation Intersection
generating a grammar. This dramatically reduces the possible program space, en-
abling IRE to be much more efficient.
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Chapter 6
RELATED WORK
Early work in this field has formalized inductive learning as a search problem [10].
Past work has shown just how useful version space algebras can be in representing a
program space [11]–[13]. Several search techniques including enumerative, stochastic,
and constraint-based algorithms have been developed in order to search the program
space in a number of domains [14]–[17].
Microsoft has made major contributions in this area. Much of the research dis-
cussed here builds upon their work in Inductive Program Synthesis. Their PROSE
SDK enables program synthesis development in a way akin to what this research ex-
plores [18]. Their FlashFill program demonstrates some of the potential applications
that this research has for millions of users [19], [20].
The specific problem of protocol reverse engineering is a very closely related area
that has been researched in order to quickly understand custom botnet protocols in
Prospex and Dispatcher [21], [22].
Because this topic can be applied to so many areas, research on it is scattered
in several fields [23]. For this reason, IRE aspires to be a centralized location and
interface for implementing program synthesis and automatic black box analysis tech-
niques.
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